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WARTIME AMERICA AND THE WIRE:

A

RESPONSE TO POSNER'S PoST-9/11
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

By Dawinder S. Sidhu*
INTRODUCTION

In the groundbreaking legal text The Common Law, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that "[t]he life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience."' Years later, fellow pragmatist Richard
A. Posner similarly noted that there is undoubtedly "a considerable
residue of cases .

.

. against which logic and science will be unavailing

and practical reason will break its often none-too-sturdy lance."2
"Practical reason," according to Posner, consists of "anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, empathy, imputation of
motives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom,
memory, 'experience,' intuition, and induction," among other things.3
It lies, Posner adds, somewhere "[b]etween the extremes of logical
persuasion and emotive persuasion."'
Posner, a well-regarded law professor and circuit court judge, is
also a prolific scholar who has offered to the academy profound ideas
on some of the law's most vexing problems.' In his recent book, Not a
Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, Posner presents a "pragmatic response"' to the pressing, unsettled ques* J.D., The George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Sidhu is a Visiting Researcher at the Georgetown University Law
Center and co-author of the forthcoming, CIVIL RiGrrs IN WARTIME: TIIE Posi-9/11 SIKH
EXPERIENCE (Ashgate). I am grateful to Nathaniel Canfield, Chen Li, Malvina Hryniewicz,
Timothy Silvester, and their colleagues for improving this article; security specialist Joseph

Mathews for his input; Amit Singh Aulakh for his research assistance; and, to my family for its
continuous support. The views expressed herein, and any errors, are solely my own.
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2 RICHARu A. POSNIER, Tii PRoutEIMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 78
3

(1990).

Id. at 73.

4 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW ANi) LITERATURE 272 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1998).

5 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J. 581, 610 (1995) ("Richard
Posner is the most prolific and creative judge now sitting on the federal bench.").
6 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcr: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 147 (2006) [hereinafter POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcT]. The pragmatic,
individualized character of the book is plain. For example, Posner acknowledges that "constitu-
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tion of how national security and constitutional rights should intersect
in this perilous, post-9/11 age.7 He specifically argues that in a balance
between national security and competing constitutional interests such
as individual liberty, the former invariably takes precedence during
times of war.8 Viewed from this lens, Posner indicates that civil libertarians must tolerate security measures-including torture 9 -implemented to protect the homeland from catastrophic terrorist events,
even if those measures infringe upon constitutional rights or depart
from established legal rules."o Posner also contends that the boundaries of executive power are expansive and that the role of the judiciary
as a check on the executive is limited in times of war. Surveillance
and profiling of Muslims, he argues, is constitutional, as are coercive
interrogation techniques. Posner's pragmatic response culminates
with the assertion that the Constitution is flexible to the extent that
the executive may permissibly invoke a "law of necessity" to authorize
extra-constitutional acts."
This Article challenges Not a Suicide Pact by using a single component of practical experience that has factored into legal reasoning:
television.12 In particular, it will invoke various themes from The
Wire-an HBO series that explores the relationship between the drug
tional theory is inherently subjective," and that constitutional decision-making is informed by
"life experience and other personal factors." Id. at 26; see also id. at 19 ("[I]t comes naturally to
[the Justices] to make constitutional law rather than just apply preexisting rules.").
7 See id. at 125 ("[T]his is not a book about how best to respond to the terrorist threat. It is
a book about the limitations that constitutional law places on the government's responses to the
threat.").
8 See id. at 6 ("Rooting out an ... enemy ... might be fatally inhibited if we felt constrained
to strict observance of civil liberties . . . .").
9 See id. at 86 (arguing that there may be situations in which a president has "the moral and
political duty" to authorize torture); see also id at 81 ("[There is] abundant evidence that torture
is often an effective method of eliciting true information . . . ."); id. at 83 ("[A]lmost everyone
... accepts the necessity of resorting to [torture] in extreme situations."); id. at 81 ("[O]nly a diehard civil libertarian will deny the propriety of using a high degree of coercion to elicit the
information.").
10 See id. at 41 ("Civil libertarians . . . are reluctant to acknowledge that national emergencies in general, or the threat of modern terrorism in particular, justify any curtailment of civil
liberties that were accepted on the eve of the emergency. They deny that civil liberties should
wax and wane with changes in the danger level.").
11 See generally id. at 111-25, 158.
12 See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 144 n.6 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting an episode of the television series M*A*S*H); id. at 148 n.11 (referring to the
children's television program Sesame Street).
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trade and law enforcement in Baltimore, Maryland"-to demonstrate
the problematic nature of the aforementioned arguments set forth in
Posner's book.14
The application of The Wire to Not a Suicide Pact suggests that
the promises of Posner's constitutional framework, however intuitively appealing, are unlikely to be a satisfactory direction of our constitutional development in the post-9/11 world. In particular, this
Article argues that liberty and security are not locked in a zero-sum
game in which the former must be sacrificed for the latter: Both interests can and must be preserved at all times. This Article further contends that the judiciary must robustly perform its role as a check on
the executive in order to safeguard individual rights against possible
overreaching, that surveillance and profiling of Muslims absent any
evidence of wrongdoing are discriminatory and inconsistent with lessons from America's wartime past, and that the use of torture not only
is counterproductive from a security standpoint but also conflicts with
the nation's assumed legal obligations. Finally, this Article asserts
that the executive has no legal or moral authority to "preserve" the
Constitution by breaking its solemn strictures.
As noted above, the post-9/11 liberty-security dynamic is largely
undefined in the United States. The use of "enhanced interrogation
techniques" and the suitability of civilian courts to try suspected terrorists, for example, remain contentious and unresolved questions."
13 See generally Home Box Office, The Wire: About the Show, http://www.hbo.com/
thewire/about/.
14 It is worth noting that The Wire has previously been invoked in judicial decisions, see,
e.g., United States v. Fiasche, 520 F.3d 694, 695 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008); Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), and in academic legal
argument, see e.g., D. Marvin Jones, The Original Meaning of Brown: Seattle, Segregation and
the Rewriting of History, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 629, 651 (2009); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The
Perils and the Promise of Comparative ConstitutionalLaw: The New Globalism and the Role of
the United States in Shaping Human Rights, 61 ARK. L. Rav. 603, 611 (2009); Colin Miller, Even
Better than the Real Thing: How Courts have been Anything but Liberal in Finding Genuine
Questions Raised as to the Authenticity of Originals Under Rule 1003, 68 MD. L. RiEv. 160, 213
(2008).
15 Compare George's Bottom Line, http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/01/obama-oncheney.htmi (Jan. 11, 2009, 9:12 EST) (containing a statement from President Barack Obama
that, "Vice President Cheney I think continues to defend what he calls extraordinary measures
or procedures and from my view waterboarding is torture. I have said that under my administration we will not torture . . . ."), with Cheney Defends Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
(National Public Radio broadcast May 13, 2009), availableat http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=104079567&ft=1&f=1001 (quoting Vice President Dick Cheney regarding the
Obama administration's ban on the Bush administration's interrogation program as saying, "I
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To be sure, Posner's particular attempt in Not a Suicide Pact to frame
how these and other relevant issues may be examined and perhaps
settled serves as a useful contribution to the legal field. This Article
aims to offer additional thoughts on the recommended course of constitutional law advanced by Posner, thoughts that may give pause to
those initially in agreement with Posner's formulation in Not a Suicide
Pact. In that sense, this Article, though critical of Posner's proffers,
hopes to modestly advance the state of our understanding of national
security and individual rights such that the nation may be closer to
reaching a consensus on the permissibility and propriety of important
post-9/11 policies and programs.
Given Posner's stature in American law, when he speaks, people
listen. Unsurprisingly, then, prominent judges, scholars, and others in
6
the legal community responded in short order to Not a Suicide Pact.1
This Article differs from those responses in at least two critical
respects. First, Posner penned his book in 2006 with the Bush administration's post-9/11 constitutional model as the canvas for his conversation on civil liberties and wartime governance. While others reacted
to Not a Suicide Pact during the administration," those efforts may be
considered premature, particularly as details of the security techniques employed by the administration and the legal cover prepared
by administration attorneys have come to light only after the end of
think that we are stripping ourselves of some of the capabilities that we used in order to block, if
you will, or disrupt activities by al-Qaida that would have led to additional attacks."). Compare
Matthew G. Olsen, Executive Director of the Guantanamo Review Detainee Taskforce,
Remarks at Georgetown University Law Center Panel Discussion: Are Military Commissions
the Right Answer? (Sept. 10, 2009) (noting, as the official responsible for assessing whether over
two hundred remaining Guantanamo detainees are to be tried or released, that Article III
courts, courts martial, and military commissions are viable options for where Guantanamo
detainees may be tried), with Major Jon Scott Jackson, -Defense Counsel, Office of Military
Commissions, Remarks at Georgetown University Law Center Panel Discussion: Are Military
Commissions the Right Answer? (Sept. 10, 2009) (arguing in his personal capacity that military
commissions are a "failure" and thus, are not an appropriate forum to administer justice with
respect to these detainees).
16 Reviews of NOT A SUICIDE PACr include Stephen Reinhardt, Weakening the Bill of
Rights: A Victory for Terrorism, 106 Micit. L. Rinv. 963 (2008); Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with
Apologies, 86 Tix. L. REv. 569 (2008); Major Matthew R. Hover, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, 197 Mi.. L. REv. 164 (2008); David Cole, How to Skip
the Constitution, 53 N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 16, 2006, at 20.
17 It appears that there are no articles dedicated to exploring NOT A SUICIDEz PACr in the
aftermath of the Bush administration's policies that necessarily formed the landscape for Posner's discussion.
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Bush's second term in 2009." With the Bush administration's security
efforts and accompanying legal approach behind us, it is now appropriate to consider the merits of Posner's proposed paradigm. Second,
aside from timing, the content of this Article is undoubtedly unique in
that it extracts information from a source that has garnered praise for
its commentary on the law and crime, but that has not yet been comprehensively applied as an instrument to illuminate open areas within
the law.
Before discussing how The Wire should lead one to reconsider
Not a Suicide Pact, it would be helpful to briefly introduce the reader
to this critically acclaimed show, particularly for those unfamiliar with
the series, and examine why The Wire is a valuable resource or reservoir of ideas for examining the course of constitutional law urged by
Posner.
I.

THE WIRE

"It's a thin line 'tween heaven and here."'

9

- Bubbles, The Wire

"Perhaps no city in the United States is more closely identified
with drug addiction than Baltimore, Maryland[,]" observed Ellen M.
Weber, law professor at the University of Maryland and head of the
university's Drug Policy Clinic.20 Although Baltimore has had a long
history of widespread drug problems,21 reviewing statistics on the
city's drug trade in 2002-2003-around when The Wire first premiered
in mid-2002 22 -provides a useful window into the underlying subject
matter of the series.
18 For example, official Bush administration memoranda that have been declassified and
released during the Obama administration are providing new and insightful information on the
Bush government's security response and related legal views. Some of these documents are
discussed in the context of torture, infra Part VIII.
19 The Wire: Old Cases (HBO television broadcast June 23, 2002).
20 Ellen M. Weber, Bridging the Barriers: Public Health Strategies for Expanding Drug
Treatment in Communities, 57 RUTGERs L. Riv. 631, 702 (2005).
21 See, e.g., William D. Mccoll, Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court: Theory and Practice
in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 478 (1996) ("[F]ifty percent of felony prosecutions in
Baltimore City were direct drug offenses, while eighty-five to ninety-five percent of all felony
prosecutions were drug-driven offenses . . . [flifty-five percent of all murders were drug
related.") (citing THE BAR ASS'N OF BAIXIMORE Cry, THE DRUG CRISIS AND UNDERFUNDING
OF Til JUSTICE SYS. IN BALTIMORE CIrY 3 (1990)).
22 The series' first episode was: The Wire: The Target (HBO television broadcast June 2,
2002).
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A 2003 Grand Jury Charge Committee Report commissioned by
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City contained several staggering
figures on the degree to which the drug trade factored into the city's
existence.23 According to the court's factual determination, there
were "approximately sixty thousand substance abusers in the city, primarily addicted to heroin and cocaine" ;24 that "equates to about nine
percent of city residents needing drug treatment." 2 5 With respect to
heroin alone, an Urban Institute Justice Policy Center study ascertained that "Baltimore has the highest concentration of heroin use in
the country" 2 6 and that "about forty percent of arrested males and
nearly half of arrested females test positive for heroin. "27
The report addressed not only pure drug use in the city but also
its impact on Baltimore's criminal justice system. The Maryland
State's Attorney's Office found that an estimated "5,867 individuals
were charged with felony narcotics violations in the City of Baltimore
in 2002,"128 which "represents 51.2% of the total number of defendants
charged for all felony crimes." 29 Moreover, "at least seventy percent
of all cases heard in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City were directly
or indirectly related to drug abuse."30 A Justice Policy Institute study
ascertained that "[t]he arrest rate in Baltimore for drug crimes was
nearly triple the rate for other large U.S. cities, with heroin and
cocaine arrests ten times the national average."31
When it comes to drug-related crime, what is most disturbing is
the number of "bodies"-that is, the number of homicides:
23 GRAND JURY FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, GRAND JURY CHARGE

COMMITTEE REPORT (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/baltgrandjuryreport
03.pdf.
24 Id. at *5 (citing NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INS. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., A PoRTRAIT OF PRISON RiENTRY IN MARYLAND, 51-52 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/

UploadedPDF/410655_MDPortraitReentry.pdf).
25 Id. (citing LA VIGNE ET AL., supra note 24, at 52).
26 Id. (citing LA VIGNE ET AL., supra note 24, at 52).
27 Id. at *6 (citing LA VIGNE ET AL., supra note 24, at 52).

28 Id. at *3.
29 GRAND JURY FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, GRAND JURY CIIARGE

COMMITTEE REPORT,

at *5 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/baltgrand

juryreport_03.pdf.
30 Id.

(citing GRAND JURY FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY, GRAND JURY

CHARGE COMMITTEE REPORT, (Sept. 2002)) (emphasis added).
31 Id. at *6 (citing JUDrri GREENE & TIMOTHY ROCHE, JUSTICE POLICY INS., CUTlING
CORRECTLY IN MARYLAND 13 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/jpi/

cc-md.pdf) (emphasis added).

2009]

WARTIME AMERICA AND THE WIRE

43

"[A]pproximately 90% of homicides in Baltimore are drug related."3 2
The Baltimore-based Johns Hopkins University published an article
noting that, for a decade, the city was home to at least 300 homicides
per year and that, in 2002, Baltimore was "the second most violent big
city in America" with the murder rate "at seven times the national

average." 33
These numbers provide a snapshot of the city that David Simon, a
thirteen-year veteran of the Baltimore Sun, 34 and Edward Burns, a
former Baltimore police detective and Baltimore city public school
teacher,3 5 intended to portray when they created The Wire.3 6 The
drugs, crime, and resultant law enforcement response are not a loose
backdrop for The Wire but form the basis for the actual plots and
characters in the series. As Simon noted after the series' fifth and
final season aired, "All the things that have been depicted in The Wire
over the past five years-the crime, the corruption-actually happened in Baltimore .

. .

. The storylines were stolen from real life."37

The Wire begins by focusing on police efforts to crack down on a
major Baltimore drug ring through the use of surveillance technology
and street-level interactions.38 As the series unfolds, Simon and Burns
delve deeper into the investigation of the Baltimore drug trade while
adding into the mix its impact on the city's blue collar working class
and on the political leadership called upon to reduce crime.39 The
Wire then takes us into the city's public schools and introduces us to
four Baltimore middle-school students contending with the appeal of
the "corners," the street locations at which drugs are sold, and the
limited benefits of a broken school system and imperfect family settings.4 0 Finally, the series brings us into the media, commenting on the
32 Id. (citing Crry OF BAL1IMORE, BALTIMORE CIry PoLICE Dr'r,
HOMIciDE UNIf,
GRAND JURY TouR, (Jan. 24, 2003)).
33 Baltimore Finally Has a Reason to Believe, TiHE JOHNs HOPKINS NEWS-LErBR, (The

John Hopkins Univ., Baltimore, Md.,), Dec. 6, 2002, available at http://media.www.jhunews
letter.com/medialstorage/paper932/news/2002/12/06/Features/Baltimore.Finally.Has.A.Reason.To.Believe-2247801.shtml (emphasis added).
34 See Home Box Office, The Wire: About the Show, http://www.hbo.com/thewire/about/.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 The Wire: Arguably the Greatest Television Programme Ever Made, DAU Y TIELEGRAPH1,

Apr. 2, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/5095500/The-Wire-arguablythe-greatest-television-programme-ever-made.htmi.
38 See Home Box Office, supra note 34.
39 See id.
40 See id.
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sad state of newspaper journalism and depicting the Baltimore Sun as
more interested in winning Pulitzer prizes than in reporting the
nuanced truth on the ground.41
Although The Wire explores tragedies of individual characters
and circumstances throughout its five-season run, perhaps the ultimate tragedy is that the significant drug trade, related crime, ineffective criminal justice approaches, poor schools, and corrupt political
practices in a major American city had gone so unnoticed by those
outside Baltimore's city limits. Simon explained in 2008 that
"[e]verything that you know about The Wire up to this point never
appeared in the newspaper.

...

Watching a TV drama to get the truth,

that's the real joke." 4 2 In that sense, The Wire functions as a documentary on the city of Baltimore. It informs the blissfully oblivious
about the hell that is Baltimore, Maryland.
What converts The Wire into an attractive and useful repository
of raw information is that it highlights the complexities and realities of
law enforcement efforts to curb the serious and seemingly endless
criminal, legal, and societal problem of the drug trade. In doing so,
The Wire knowingly and necessarily draws parallels between the war
on drugs and the war on terror, as others have recognized. 43 Accordingly, the series' depiction of Baltimore's wide-ranging struggle with
this pandemic is a helpful tool by which we may analyze a proposed
response to a broader criminal, legal, and social predicamentterrorism."
See id.
Show Tracker: The Wire, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/showtracker/thewire/ (Mar. 4,
2008, 9:07 PST).
43 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq & Christopher Muller, The War on Crime as Precursorto the War
on Terror, 36 lNr'L J.L. CRIME & Jusr. 215, 215 (2008) (alluding to The Wire in introducing its
discussion on the war on crime and the "war on terror"); Robert David Sullivan, Slow Hand,
THE BOSTON PHOENIx, Aug. 15-22, 2002 ("Series creator [David] Simon, who developed the
story line with Edward Burns, isn't the first to express skepticism toward the War on Drugs, but
The Wire has a fresh resonance because of its implicit parallels to the new War on Terrorism."),
available at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/arts/tv/documents/02394694.htm; see also
Daniel R. Williams, Who Got Game? Boumediene v. Bush and the Judicial Gamesmanship of
Enemy-Combatant Detention, 43 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1, 2 (2008) (discussing "the game" as it
pertains to the drug trade and as it is portrayed in The Wire, and noting the comparisons
between the war on drugs and the war on terror).
44 It should be noted that a number of substantive points emerge from The Wire and that
while this Article references a defined set of themes from the show, it does not purport to present an exhaustive account of the possible ways in which the series may be applied to NOT A
SUICIDE PACr, or to the anti-terrorism debate more generally. Moreover, I readily acknowledge
that even those themes which I selected are open to interpretation and may have different mean41
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COMMON GROUND

"This is what makes a good night on my watch. Absence of a
negative."4 5
- Major Howard "Bunny" Colvin, The Wire

On September 11, 2001, nineteen Muslim men hijacked commercial airplanes and used them to attack the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon; in all, the attacks killed close to three thousand civilians.4 6
The Supreme Court noted, "Americans will never forget the devastation wrought by these acts." 47 The attacks upon the United States
triggered a military conflict 48 and placed the nation under a specter of
future acts of terrorism.4 9
ings for others. I have attempted, however, out of an unwavering respect for the creators and
through meticulous research, to be as faithful as possible to the purpose of the series as I understand it to be. In working with the editors of this publication, who share my significant interest
and appreciation for The Wire, I am confident that my understanding of the series is well within
reason. To the extent others disagree, it is my hope that this Article may serve as a useful
starting point for further conversations on The Wire and contemporary issues within the American legal system, including the post-9/11 relationship between national security and individual
rights.
45 The Wire: All Due Respect (HBO television broadcast Sept. 27, 2004).
46 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511 (2004) ("On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda
terrorist network used hijacked commercial airliners to attack prominent targets in the United
States. Approximately 3,000 people were killed in those attacks.").
47 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006).
48 On September 18, 2001, Congress authorized the President to "use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or "harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons." Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). Although it did not formally declare war, Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF) arguably "activated the President's traditional war powers in
the conflict against al Qaeda." David J. Barron & Marty Lederman, The Commander in Chiefat
the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 689, 731 (2008) (citing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594 (citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507 (plurality
opinion))). AUMF also "helps satisf[y] modern de jure and de facto requirements for a state of
war." J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO.
L.J. 463, 536 (2007) (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, §2). Indeed, President
George W. Bush invoked his authority under the AUMF to, among other things, deploy "Armed
Forces into Afghanistan to wage a military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime
that had supported it." Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004). President Bush also invoked his
authority under the AUMF to designate individuals, including Jose Padilla, as "enemy combatants" and thereby hold them in a military-not civilian-detention system. Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
542 U.S. 426, 431 (2004).
49 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate
Change, 107 CoLum. L. REv. 503, 516 (2007) ("In the period shortly after the 9/11 attacks, 88%
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There is little doubt that those in charge of the security of the
nation were pressed with an awesome responsibility: To keep
America safe by thwarting a relatively obscure, scattered, global network of fundamentalists from attacking again. In his memoir, Jack
Goldsmith, a former Assistant Attorney General under President
George W. Bush, wrote that the administration was "under pressure
to stop a second attack by an enemy it couldn't see and didn't fully
understand," that the President held the "ultimate obligation" to
ensure another attack did not take place, and that the government was
"largely in the dark about where or how the next terrorist attack
[would] occur."5 0 David Addington, legal counsel to Vice President
Dick Cheney, warned Goldsmith that if a second attack occurred, "the
blood of the hundred thousand people who die[d]" would be on his
hands."* To Goldsmith, then, the success of his efforts and those of his
colleagues would be evidenced by "the absence" of a second attack.52
Posner uses the unimaginably dire national situation in which
Goldsmith and others were operating as the starting point for his analysis, reminding the reader of the urgent and gripping nature of their
task.53 He writes, for example, that "terrorist leaders may even now
be regrouping, and preparing an attack that will produce destruction
on a scale to dwarf 9/11"54 and "wielding nuclear bombs, dirty bombs,
biological weapons capable of killing millions of people, or other
weapons of mass destruction."" Posner stresses that the threat of terrorism faced by the United States is very real, and Goldsmith explains
that those public servants who assumed the mantle of American
security attempted, in good faith and under trying circumstances, to
of Americans believed that it was either very likely or somewhat likely that there would be
'another terrorist attack . . . within the next few months'-with about half of Americans worrying about the possibility that a family member might 'become a victim of a terrorist attack,' and
over 40% worrying that 'terrorist attacks might take place where [they] live or work."' (quoting
PROGRAM ON INT'L Poicy

Ar-rrfUDEs, AMS. AND THE WORLD,

TERRORISM, http://www.

americans-world.org/digest/global-issues/terrorism/terrorism-perception.cfm) (alteration in
original)).
50 JACK GoLosMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 67-69, 75 (2007).
51 Id. at 71. Similarly, in The Wire, an acting police commissioner rather ominously
reminds his district commanders that their satisfactory performance is expected regardless of
how difficult their tasks on the streets may seem by stating, "[Tihe Gods will not save you." The
Wire: Dead Soldiers (HBO television broadcast Oct. 3, 2004).
52 GoLDSMITH supra note 50, at 188.
53 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcT, supra note 6, at 148.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 47.
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prevent subsequent terrorist catastrophes from taking place on the
homeland.56
There can be little doubt that security branches of the government are faced with an outstanding duty for which the only measure
of success may be "nothing"-that is, the non-existence of an event.
Such was the case with the Baltimore law enforcement community's
response to the war on drugs in The Wire. In one particularly telling
scene, when the city police's creative and frustrated efforts to cripple
the drug trade are coming to a head, a police officer attempting to
effectuate a drug bust is shot by his criminal targets." The officer's
commander, Howard "Bunny" Colvin, learns of the shooting in the
middle of the night, and shortly thereafter reflects, "Tonight is a good
night. Why? Because my shot cop didn't die. And it hit me . . . This
is what makes a good night on my watch: Absence of a negative."5 9
Whether in the war on terror or the war on drugs, the powers that be
may be oddly reassured by non-existence of anything "bad" occurring
during their tenure.
What must be disputed is not the starting point of Posner's analysis, but his logical progression.6 0 For starters, Posner makes two
improvident leaps from the accepted propositions that the terrorist
dangers to America are clear and that the security arm of the American government is performing a daunting task. First, he argues that
identifying whether security responses to 9/11 are constitutional
requires a straight balancing of civil liberties and security.6 Second,
he effectively contends that ensuring security is more important than

56 See Goitsmrrii supra note 50, at 175 ("Despite our many fights, and despite what I view
as [Addington's] many errors of judgment, large and small, I believe he acted in good faith to
protect the country.").
5 See The Wire: All Due Respect (HBO television broadcast Sept. 27, 2004).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., Richard A. Clarke, The Trauma of 9/11 is No Excuse, WAsI. PosTr, May 31,
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009
052901560.html (rejecting the notion that the trauma of 9/11 and the high-level responsibilities
that arose from the attacks justify the government's response to the terrorist threat).
61 Posner argues that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have created an opportunity in which the
balance between liberty and security must be modified. "The challenge," he writes, "is to [strike
at] the balance between liberty and safety." POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 6, at 31.
Posner also noted that "[a] national emergency, such as war, creates disequilibrium in the
existing system of constitutional rights." Id. at 147.
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safeguarding civil liberties.62 Put differently, according to Posner, the
post-9/11 world requires a balancing of civil liberties and security
responses which must come out in favor of enhancing security at the
cost of limiting liberty.
III.

THE ZERO Sum GAME

"No one wins. One side just loses more slowly." 63
- Roland "Prez" Pryzbylewski, The Wire
Posner suspects that Supreme Court Justices generally "base their
decisions on a balancing of anticipated consequences, pro and con."'
In Not a Suicide Pact, he explores one particular type of judicial balancing: The extent to which "civil liberties based on the Constitution
should be permitted to vary [based on] the threat level." 65 Posner suggests that "readjustmentfs]" between liberty and security occur "from
time to time as the weights of the respective interests change." 66 The
terrorist attacks of 9/11, according to Posner, demand a recalibration

of the "constitutional balance between liberty and safety." 67 In short,
in the context of post-9/11 America, Posner believes that "the proper
way to think about constitutional rights in a time such as this is in
terms of the metaphor of a balance. "68 An important consequence of
this balancing paradigm is that it necessarily presumes that tipping the
balance to enhance one side must harm the other. Posner admits this,
stating, "The scope of governmental power to take actions to protect
national security is the reciprocal of the individual's rights to liberty
and privacy." 69
Relatedly, throughout Not a Suicide Pact, Posner describes the

debate about the relationship between liberty and security as a purely
62 That liberty must recede in the post-9/11 climate is an effective afterthought in the Posner analysis. Posner's inquiry therefore boils down to the extent to which liberty must wane. See
id. at 50-51 ("[T]he relevant question is not whether curtailing civil liberties imposes costs, to
which the answer is obvious; it is whether the costs exceed the benefits.").
63 The Wire: Refugees (HBO television broadcast Oct. 1, 2006).
64 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAC], supra note 6, at 28.
65 Id. at 7.
66 Id. at 148; see also id. at 152 ("Constitutional law is a looser garment, continually
rewoven by Supreme Court Justices mindful (one hopes) of the need to balance security and
liberty concerns as the weights of these concerns shift.").
67 Id. at 148.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 8.
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bifurcated tussle between two players: civil libertarians and national
security hawks.70 He appears to do this, at least in part, to simplify the
discussion and to label and criticize, with greater ease, any who
express concerns for liberty in times of war. Posner defines civil libertarians as those who believe that: (1) "[T]he Constitution is about
protecting individual rights rather than about promoting community
interests";7' (2) "[P]ast curtailments of civil liberties were gratuitous
responses to hysterically exaggerated fears";7 2 (3) The Bush administration abused civil liberties without any evidence; 73 (4)
"[G]overnment always errs on the side of exaggerated threats to
national security;" 74 (5) The current threat is exaggerated, and post-9/
11 security measures require no changes in order to adequately cope
with the current threat;75 and (6) Any curtailment of civil liberties during an emergency will continue once the emergency has passed,7 6 and,
thus, any curtailment of civil liberties will lead to a "slippery slope." 7
The zero-sum game frame of reference, however sensible on its
face when two parties are in apparent opposition, does not comport
with the complex realities of actual law enforcement. The Wire illustrates the folly of using a win-loss scorecard in the wartime context.
Baltimore City public middle school teacher and former City police
officer Roland "Prez" Pryzbylewski, comments on the plight of urban
Baltimore's war on drugs.7 " He states that tradeoffs between seemingly competing interests do not yield a positive result for one side but
rather degrade both to different degrees, thereby permitting the
impression that one side is a legitimate beneficiary of any exchanges
between the two. 79 For example, the Baltimore City police invested
significant resources and time into infiltrating drug camps, only to capture mid-level operatives and low-end dealers who shield those higher
in the food chain from prosecution by "taking" charges and not
70 See POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 6, at 67.

71 Id. at 41-42.
72 Id. at 42.
73 See id. at 47.
74 Id. at 42.
75 Id.
76 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAC, supra note 6, at 47 ("[Civil libertarians] are also being

inconsistent, for they consider the post-9/1 I security measures particularly ominous because the
struggle against terrorism may never end.").
77 Id. at 44.
78 The Wire: Refugees (HBO television broadcast Oct. 1, 2006).
79 Id.
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"snitching" or divulging information about others in the enterprise;
these bottom-drawer dealers will simply be replaced by other
"soldiers." 0 Although removing some dealers from the streets may
suggest that the police have hurt the drug trade, in truth they have
only temporarily interrupted the normal operations of the drug ring
and, in the process, diverted its attention from more productive techniques.m In short, there is no outright winner.
Just as the loss by one side in The Wire does not translate into an
actual gain to the other, liberty and security in the post-9/11 America
are not necessarily mired in a zero-sum game. Our liberties, for
instance, would certainly wane if al Qaeda used weapons of mass
destruction to kill innocent civilians on American soil, but security
programs and practices may just as surely threaten to erode individual
liberties. 82 Accordingly, Posner's "either-or" proposition wrongly
implies that the people must choose between safety and individual
rights; by doing so, it condones Posner's preferred option, that security
may be maintained at the expense of civil liberties.
As the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (9/11 Commission) noted, "The choice between security
and liberty is a false choice." 83 On one hand, as the 9/11 Commission
observed, "[N]othing is more likely to endanger America's liberties
than the success of a terrorist attack at home."' On the other, "[I]f
our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to
defend.""
The latter concern has resounded in the post-9/11 Supreme
Court. In 2004, the Court made clear that "[i]t is during our most
challenging and uncertain moments that . . . we must preserve our
80 See The Wire: Old Cases (HBO television broadcast June 23, 2002).

81 See e.g., The Wire: One Arrest (HBO television broadcast July 21, 2002) (demonstrating
that, when a street-level dealer is arrested with a large quantity of drugs, the Barksdale gang
stops doing business over pay-phones; otherwise, it continues dealing drugs as normal).
82 For example, the use of torture, the indefinite detention of individuals without formal
charge, warrantless domestic surveillance of Americans, and blanket profiling of Muslims and
those perceived to be Muslim may be part of a security response, but may diminish individual
liberties. More specifically, these security practices suggest that several American values and
constitutional protections may be compromised, including an insistence on humane treatment
for all, habeas rights, providing due process in the deprivation of liberty, Fourth Amendment's
prohibitions on warrantless searches, and equality under the law.
83 NAr'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST A-rACKS UPON THE U.S., TinE 9/11 COMMIssioN REPORT
395 (2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.9-llcommission.gov/report/.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad."86 It
is also shared by those in the security community. For example,
Royce C. Lamberth, the presiding judge of the United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) at the time of 9/11 and
current chief judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, advised that, "We have to understand you can fight the war
[on terrorism] and lose everything if you have no civil liberties left
when you get through fighting the war."" He further pointed out that
the FISA Court has "worked to protect civil liberties while protecting
the country itself. The judges asked themselves: Are we going to lose
our liberties if we approve this kind of surveillance?"" Indeed, Tom
Ridge, the first head of the Department of Homeland Security-the
agency formed after 9/11 to assemble relevant information from federal, state, and local governmental bodies to detect and dismantle terrorist operations-noted in his farewell remarks to the Pennsylvania
General Assembly, "We must reject the false choice of liberty versus
security. We can and must have both. We will be safe. And we will
not let the terrorists change our essential way of life."8 9 Edwin Meese,
Attorney General of the United States during the Cold War, likewise
remarked after 9/11, "Government's obligation is a dual one: to protect civil safety and security against violence and to preserve civil liberty. This is not a zero-sum game.""o The nation's ability to serve the
"dual" interests of national security and individual rights refutes Posner's insistence that a balancing test must be employed."
86 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 164-65 (1963)).
87 Michael J. Sniffen, Ex-Surveillance Judge Criticizes Warrantless Taps, WASII. PosTr, June
24, 2007, at A07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/23/
AR2007062301125.html.
88 Mary Jo Patterson, A View from Inside the FISA Court, THE SrAR-LEDGER, Aug. 21,
2005, available at http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/news/ledger/stories/patriotact/
insidefisa.html.
89 Federally Speaking (W. Pa. Chapter of the Fed. Bar Ass'n & Allegheny County Bar
Ass'n, Pittsburgh, Pa.) at 1, available at http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Misc/fsp09.
pdf.
90 Edwin Meese, Patriot Act's Bum Rap, WAsH. TIMES, July 8, 2004, at A17 (emphasis
added), available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jul/07/20040707-090159-8291r/
print/.
91 Both the security of the people and the principles to which the American people subscribe can be upheld in concert. Allow me to use the security practices noted in footnote 82 as
the operative examples. Regarding torture, interrogation techniques that do not rise to the level
of torture may be used to extract information from detainees; as to indefinite detention of
detainees, such detainees should proceed through some civilian or quasi-legal system that safe-
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The concept that a secure nation may be maintained and individual rights simultaneously preserved dates back before 9/11. In 1962,
Chief Justice Earl Warren declared that "as always, the people, no less
than their courts, must remain vigilant to preserve the principles of
our Bill of Rights, lest in our desire to be secure we lose our ability to
be free." 92 In fact, the concept extends to the time of the Framers,
men fresh from their experiences with the oppressive King George III
who were intent on creating a lasting experiment in political order
that derived its powers from the consent of the governed. Benjamin
Franklin, an elder statesman among them, famously wrote in a letter
to a state official, "Those who would give up essential Liberty, to
purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor
Safety." 93
Furthermore, Posner's dichotomy of civil libertarians and
national security hawks serves as an inaccurate representation of the
manner in which the debate regarding liberty and security actually
takes place. One cannot reasonably claim that the 9/11 Commission,
which was composed of former lawmakers, judges, and others of different political stripes-a former presiding judge of the FISA court
and Reagan-appointee to the federal bench, an attorney general
appointed by and who worked directly under President Reagan, a former chief justice, a principal American Revolutionary of the very system of governance in which we now live-was a group of either civil
libertarians or national security hawks. Rather, just like Posner, they
were quite simply Americans interested in the welfare of the nation. 94
guards classified information while still providing them with basic legal rights to ensure a fair and
just trial; concerning surveillance, information gathering in America may take place pursuant to
tailored warrants provided by a specialized national security court or the existing FISA court;
and lastly regarding profiling, intelligence measures should rely on evidentiary behavior, not
race or religion, as the touchstone for a finding that an individual should be subject to additional
scrutiny.
92 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 60 A.F. L. Rfv. 5, 27 (2007) (article was
delivered as the third James Madison Lecture at the New York University Law Center on February 1, 1962).
93 Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations Requested from the Congressional
Research Service 73 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989) (quoting Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly:
Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1975), in 6 THE PAPERS OF- BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, at 242 (Leo-

nard W. Labaree ed., 1963), available at http://www.bartleby.com/73/1056.html.
94 It is ironic that Posner would resort to the use of such broad labels in the first instance.
In previous works, Posner decried the invocation of value-laden sentiments precisely because
they serve merely as restatements of one's views and therefore do not enrich or advance the
legal debate at hand. See generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Immorality and Inefficiency of an
Efficient Breach, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 61, 81-82 (2006) (summarizing Richard A.
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Positioning the debate as one between civil libertarians and
aggressive defenders of national security programs is problematic not
only in its characterizations but also in its practical consequences with
respect to formulating relevant policy. To assign certain recommendations to a civil libertarian or national security camp will legitimize the
two-camp system to which all policymakers are assigned and soil those
very substantive ideas with preconceived, fixed notions regarding
what the recommendations entail. The ultimate result will be a reflexive support or disdain for the ideas, and policymaking will be robbed
of an open, impartial, and thorough discussion process.
Daniel B. Prieto, Director of the Independent Task Force on Civil
Liberties and National Security at the Council on Foreign Relations,
notes, "[I]ssues of national security and civil liberties are akin to theological issues. That is, opinions are so strongly held that they are nonnegotiable."9 5 As a result, "Divides over national security and civil
liberties have become so deep that they stand in the way of America's
ability to forge a critical national foreign policy consensus on how to
deal with the strategic challenge of transnational terrorism and defeat
al Qaeda."96 Prieto adds, "[A]lthough security considerations and
civil liberties protections are often in tension, the two need not exist in
zero-sum, something that is too readily implied when policymakers
discuss the need to balance security and civil liberties.""
Robert Chesney, who served on the Detainee Policy Task Force,
describes the real-life problems of a polarized debate with respect to
the government's detention policy. He writes, "[T]he national dialogue has been dominated by a pair of dueling narratives that together
reduce the space available for nuanced, practical solutions that may
require compromise from both camps."" Put differently, "[T]he public receives the message that detention policy . . . involves a binary

choice between black-and-white alternatives, with apocalyptic stakes.
Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1637 (1998), and PosNER, TiE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCi3, supra note 2, in so far as Posner addresses the
unhelpfulness of making value judgments in legal argument).
95 DANIEL B. PRIETO, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, WAR AnouT TERROR: CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY AiER 9/11 2 (2009), available at http://www.cfr.org/
content/publications/attachments/CivilLibertiesWorkingPaper.pdf.
96 Id. at 6.
97 Id.
98 Robert Chesney, A Detention Debate in Black and White, WASI. POST, Sept. 12, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/09/AR20090909
02214.html.
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The net effect is to shrink the political space within which reasonable,
sustainable policies might be crafted with bipartisan support."9 9 As a
result, the possibility of achieving a resolution over the detention policy diminishes: "The path to sound and sustainable detention policy
almost certainly will require compromises and a willingness to incur
political risk at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue; however, today's
culture of distrust and polarization makes this far more difficult than it
needs or ought to be.""oo
If Posner continues to insist that post-9/11 homeland policies are
decided by pushes and pulls between civil libertarians and national
security hawks as they trade off liberty for security and vice versa, one
side may appear to realize a short-term gain, as The Wire's Prez
observed with respect to the war on drugs. But with an absence of a
cohesive perspective that embodies liberty and safety considerations
and that is the product of meaningful, flexible debate, those who will
ultimately suffer both in the present and in the eyes of posterity are
the American people.
IV.

RIGGING THE GAME

"Juking the stats."10
- Roland "Prez" Pryzbylewski, The Wire

In Not a Suicide Pact, Posner not only presents an unhelpful balancing scheme between liberty and security, a contest that is attended
only by civil libertarians and hawkish security folks, but then also
stacks the deck against the preservation of liberty such that security
will invariably be dominant and liberty must consequently give way. 102
In particular, Posner posits that in times of war, greater weight is to be
placed on security measures due to the heightened interest in protecting the homeland. He writes, "In times of danger, the weight of concerns for public safety increases relative to that of liberty concerns,
and civil liberties are narrowed."os He continues, "[A] decline in
99 Id.
100 Id.

101 The Wire: Know Your Place (HBO television broadcast Nov. 12, 2006).
102 Posner discusses the fate of several individual liberties, including freedom from torture,
surveillance, airport profiling, and chilled religious speech, which will be examined, infra Parts
VI, Vill.
103 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcr, supra note 6, at 9.
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security causes the balance to shift against liberty,"" and "the more
endangered we feel, the more weight we place on the interest in
safety."1o

Moreover, according to Posner, elevating security concerns above
liberty interests may be necessary to ward off future terrorist activity.
He speculates that "[a] minor curtailment of present civil liberties, to
the extent that it reduces the probability of a terrorist attack, reduces
the likelihood of a major future curtailment of those liberties."1 0 6
Otherwise, "rooting out" the enemy "might be fatally inhibited if we
felt constrained to strict observance of civil liberties.""o7 From the
government's point of view, Posner simply notes, "[I]t is better to be
safe than sorry."108
Prez and others in The Wire often expressed their disappointment
with the concept of "juking the stats."' 09 This refers to a situation in
which the powers that be-police commanders, high-level public
school officials, or politicians-would manipulate perspectives or
information to ultimately achieve a predetermined, preferred outcome.11 o It refers to the rigging of the system; it is result-oriented
decisionmaking by those at the top of the power structure to the detri104 Id. at 46-47.
105 Id. at 148.
106 Id. at 46.
107 Id. at 6.
108 Id. at 45.

109 See The Wire: The Wire (HBO television broadcast July 7, 2002); see also The Wire:
Misgivings (HBO television broadcast Nov. 19, 2006) (involving an example of "juking the stats"
where students were "taught" the standardized test, rather than the underlying skills, to ensure
satisfactory test scores so as to indicate high teaching quality and student achievement).
110 The Wire co-creator David Simon expressed his views on the concept of "juking the
stats":
You show me anything that depicts institutional progress in America, school test scores,
crime stats, arrest reports, arrest stats, anything that a politician can run on, anything that
somebody can get a promotion on. And as soon as you invent that statistical category, 50
people in that institution will be at work trying to figure out a way to make it look as if
progress is actually occurring when actually no progress is . . . . In the same way that a
police commissioner or a deputy commissioner can get promoted, and a major can
become a colonel, and an assistant school superintendent can become a school superintendent, if they make it look like the kids are learning, and that they're solving crime.
And that was a front row seat for me as a reporter. Getting to figure out how the crime
stats actually didn't represent anything, once they got done with them.
See generally Bill Moyers Journal,Interview with David Simon (PBS television broadcast Apr.
17, 2009) [hereinafter PBS-Simon Interview], available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/
04172009/transcripti.html.
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ment of those stakeholders with little or no bargaining ability.' For
example, in an effort to appease the city's political leadership and the
public to which the politicians were accountable, the high-level police
officials implemented a strategy to increase the absolute number of
arrests; in essence, they manufactured the impression that they were
making a dent in city crime.1 12 Although the number of arrests did
increase, the arrests were of minor users and offenders; as such, police
resources were drawn away from infiltrating the primary sources of
the city's drug and related crime problems.1 13 Even when the police
furnished statistics that supported the suggestion that they were successful in addressing crime, in actuality the drug camp was unfazed
and the public remained vulnerable to widespread drug trafficking
and associated criminal activities.1 4 The campaign, though successful
on its face, was in truth ineffective and counterproductive.
Just as information could be "juked" to support a self-fulfilling
outcome in The Wire, legal commentators recognize that the constitutional equation suggested by Posner is not objectively calibrated, but
instead will yield only one pre-determined answer: Civil liberties must
defer to security programs or policies. David Cole of the Georgetown
University Law Center observed that "constitutional interpretation
for Posner is little more than an all-things-considered balancing actand when the potential costs of a catastrophic terrorist attack are
placed on the scale, the concerns of constitutional rights and civil liberties are almost inevitably outweighed.""' Two others criticize Posner's law and economics approach to security issues because his
"method works largely through a cost-benefit analysis where equality
and antisubordination never quite measure up to the concerns against

111 As reflected in Simon's comments, PBS-Simon Interview, supra note 110, the illegitimate furtherance of a goal by the powerful and the simultaneous disservice to the powerless
spans various contexts of The Wire, from the schoolhouse, to the police station, to city hall. It is
also consistent with the operations of the drug trade. See The Wire: Final Grades (HBO television broadcast Dec. 10, 2006) (including a soliloquy by Preston "Bodie" Broadus, a lower-level
drug dealer, in which he comments on his steadfast loyalty to senior drug bosses and their reluctance to reciprocate: "This game is rigged, man.").
112 See, e.g., The Wire: Time After Time (HBO television broadcast Sept. 19, 2004).
113 See, e.g., The Wire: Straight and True (HBO television broadcast Oct. 17, 2004).
114 See, e.g., The Wire: Moral Midgetry (HBO television broadcast Nov. 14, 2004).
115 David Cole, The Poverty of Posner's Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2007) (book review).
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which they are being measured."ll 6 Similarly, another commentator
writes that Posner's "method . . . tilts in the favor of security more

often than not."' 17
In proposing that post-9/11 constitutional questions implicating
the security of the nation be reduced to a balancing of purportedly
competing interests, Posner offers a mechanism that is not only faulty
in design, as both security and liberty can be simultaneously managed,
but also troublesome in its application, as security invariably subjugates other constitutional interests, specifically individual rights.
Accordingly, Posner's recommendation is consistent with the "rigging" exhibited and discredited in The Wire-giving the impression of
an objective approach to produce a pre-determined outcome, but in
essence depriving the people of a legitimate debate on the proper
relationship between national security and individual rights.
V.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

"The king stay the king."118
- D'Angelo Barksdale, The Wire

Thus far, Posner has argued that constitutional questions implicating national security are to be decided through a balancing of liberty and security, whereby security invariably is the prevailing
American interest. What role does Posner envision for the courtsthe institution charged with preventing the executive from encroaching on the Constitution-in his balancing scheme? In short, for Posner, it is one of judicial abdication.
Himself an appellate judge, Posner claims the courts are incompetent to perform their function as arbiters of the law in national
security cases and, thus, effectively asks judges to trust those advancing the security programs or policies under review. In particular, he
writes that judges "[know] little about the needs of national security"
and thus will be "unlikely" to substitute their judgment for "that of
the executive branch."1 19 For example, in the context of indefinite
116 Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman, Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Charting a
Method to Reduce Madness in Post-9/I1 Power and Rights Conflicts, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 365,
387 (2008).
117 Jarrod Stuard, Book Review, 39 N.Y.U. J. Irrr'i L. & Pot. 475, 504 (2006) (reviewing
POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcr, supra note 6).
118 The Wire: The Buys (HBO television broadcast June 16, 2002).
119 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcr, supra note 6, at 9.
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detention, Posner candidly states that "the greater the perceived terrorist menace, the greater will be, and should be, the judges' inclination to resolve doubts in favor of detention and its continuation unless
and until the danger diminishes significantly."1 20 Moreover, Posner
claims that it is Congress that should serve as the more effective check
on executive authority.121
In the third episode of The Wire, the writers created a scene that
co-creator David Simon called the "preamble" of the series. 122 in it,
D'Angelo Barksdale, a mid-level operative in a major Baltimore drug
ring led by his cousin, teaches two "hoppers" (younger, low-level dealers) how to play the game of chess, using characters in "the game"
(the code within the drug universe) as reference points the youngsters
would understand. 2 3 Barksdale explains that the pawns are like the
"soldiers," the loyal low-level dealers on "the front lines."124 The
pawns, Barksdale continues, can become queens if they proceed to the
other end of the chessboard; however, pawns do not survive long and
are killed off by way of jail or death-in Barksdale's words, the pawns
"get capped quick," and they are "out of the game early." 125 Accordingly, without any rivals, "the king stay the king."1 26 Simon states that
the scene is a comment on the stratified system in which "nobody
moves" and "there is no improvement in anyone's station."1 27 As
those on the bottom possess insufficient power to correct those at the
top, and given the absence of any moderating agents of comparative
power, the king remains in full control.
The existence of an all powerful monarch is fundamentally what
the American constitutional tradition seeks to avoid. It is one of
checks and balances-the existence of co-equal branches of government empowered to prevent impermissible overreaching by the other
two. As James Madison, quoting Montesquieu, declared in Federalist
No. 47, "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive
120 Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
121 See id. at 150 ("Congress knows more about national security and so may perform a
more effective checking function on the president than the courts are able to do.").
122 PBS-Simon Interview, supra note 110.
123 The Wire: The Buys (HBO television broadcast June 16, 2002).
124 Id.

Id
Id
127 PBS-Simon Interview, supra note 110.
125

126
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powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates."l 2 8 The
Supreme Court has echoed this concept, stating, "The Constitution
sought to divide the delegated powers of the new federal government
into three defined categories, legislative, executive, and judicial" 2 9
and "[e]ven a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals . .. that
checks and balances were the foundation of a structure of government
that would protect liberty."' 30 Justice Robert H. Jackson-a man
whose words on the interplay of liberty and security from the midtwentieth century have come to be viewed as highly instructive in
today's post-9/11 America' 3 -understood that the purpose of separating federal power into three co-equal parts was to "diffus[e] power the
better to secure liberty."13 2 Put differently by the full Court decades
later, "[T]he greatest security against tyranny ... lies ... in a carefully
crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch."'
Constitutional scholar Akhil Reed Amar has perhaps described
the constitutional design most clearly: "The structure of separation of
powers . . . protects constitutional values by providing three separate,

overlapping, and mutually reinforcing remedies-legislative, executive, and judicial-against unconstitutional federal conduct."' 34 This
structure calls for the active participation of each branch; otherwise, a
branch asleep at the switch may permit the others to infringe upon the
liberty of the people and thus degrade the entire republic. As Alexan128 THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison) ("[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the
same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others .. .. This policy of
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through
the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in
all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the
). This was a
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other ....
viewpoint seemingly followed in practice by the Framers. See e.g., DAVID) MCCULLOUGH, 1776
80 (Simon & Schuster 2005) (discussing George Washington's decision to confer with Congress
regarding the extent of his powers, as Washington "was not fond of 'stretching' his powers;"
opining that it was Washington's "sensitivity to and respect for the political ramifications of his
command" that made him such a remarkable political general).
129 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
130 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
131 See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104
W. VA. L. REv. 571, 592 (2002) ("Justice Jackson's instruction from sixty years ago must guide
our steps today.").
132 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
133 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989).
134 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1504 (1987).
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der Bickel wrote, "Our government consists of discrete institutions,
but the effectiveness of the whole depends on their involvement with
one another, on their intimacy, even if it often is the sweaty intimacy
of creatures locked in combat."' 35 This is particularly true in the context of wartime decisions. As the 9/11 Commission noted in this
respect, a "shift of power and authority to the government calls for an
enhanced system of checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life."13 6 Justice Holmes's colleague on
the Supreme Court, Justice Louis D. Brandeis, similarly said, "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the government's purposes are beneficent."' 37 More recently, Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor memorably wrote in 2004 that "a state of war
is not a blank check for the President."138
With respect to Posner's proposition that Congress be an energetic check on the executive in wartime situations, the constitutional
concept of the separation of powers among three co-equal branches
does not contemplate that Congress alone or primarily be entrusted to
protect the people from improper federal conduct. Indeed, in Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton declared that "the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority." 139 Thus, it is only through the
robust performance of the respective functions of each arm of the federal government that the nation as a whole may properly move forward in times of peace as well as uncertainty. 140
Posner's view of the judiciary's function in national security cases
hardly reflects the notion that the courts are an essential part of the
checks and balances constitutional design. By suggesting that judges
should respond not to the law and the proven facts of a particular case
135 ALEXANDER M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUs BRANCH:

THE SUPREME COURT AT

T-lH BAR OF POLITICS 261 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
136 NAT'L COMM'N

ON TERRORIST

ATIACKS

UPON

THE U.S.,

THE 9/11

COMMISSION

REPORT 191 (2004) (emphasis added); but see POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACr, supra note 6, at

149 ("[T]he cornerstone of judicial interpretation of the Constitution in emergency situations . ..
is judicial modesty.").
137 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
138 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
139 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. ("The interpretation of the

laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.").
140 See BICKEL, supra note 135, at 261.
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but rather to perceptions of threats, Posner would have the judiciary
limit its role due to threats that may be speculative and inherently
subjective. Moreover, these perceptions of threats will be projected
by the very party purportedly seeking to counter the threats. The
judge's decision may as well be determined by the government's
color-coded threat chart.'4 1
Rather than rely on others, the courts should perform their traditional, independentl 42 duty to ascertain the constitutionality of the
government's programs or policies, even if they are in the realm of
national security. The courts are routinely presented with complicated cases, such as ERISA matters, challenges to environmental regulations, and intellectual property disputes. In those instances, it is
incumbent upon the parties to provide the courts with accessible, reliable information that will enable them to reach an appropriate decision. The importance or intricacy of the national security programs or
policies at issue should not discharge the courts from determining the
constitutionality of the government's actions, but rather should compel the parties to take greater care in presenting their legal arguments
and the factual predicates for their contentions to the courts.
The notion that the courts should play a vital role in constitutional questions of a national security nature is more than a theoretical hope or abstract goal. It is a function that the courts have
traditionally performed without any evidence that doing so has
harmed the security pursuits of the other coordinate branches. As
former constitutional law professor and current Obama administration official Cass Sunstein observed in 2005, "American practice suggests that judges are most unlikely to err by protecting civil liberties;
in our history, it is hard to find even a single case in which judicial
protection of freedom seriously damaged national security." 4 3
For Posner, the courts are ill-suited to decide national security
issues and should therefore rely on Congress to serve the legitimate
checking function. The federal judiciary, however, is the very branch
entrusted by the people and designed by the Framers to safeguard
141 See DEP'T OF HOMELAND Suc., HOMELAND

SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL Dateenv.

3

(March 11, 2002), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc-1214508631313.shtm (creating
the Homeland Security Advisory System).
142 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (asserting the independence of the judicial
branch by reviewing and ultimately nullifying the congressionally-enacted Judiciary Act of 1789).
143 Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASu. L.
RFv. 693, 702 (2005).
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liberty against legislative overreaching, even in difficult national circumstances. Without a meaningful role for the courts in national
security matters, the executive, like a "king" over security decisions
and the fate of individual rights, will remain the king.'" With a powerful executive unrestrained by the federal judiciary or legislature, the
"pawns" in modern American society will be without recourse and
may have their rights abridged.' 45 This is a result that, as will be
examined in the next section, Posner is willing to accept.
VI.

PROFILING

"They're dead where it doesn't count."14 6
- Mike Fletcher, The Wire

Posner finds little trouble equating the terrorist threat with Muslims. By doing so, he finds that Muslims in America are appropriate
targets of national security measures. He writes, "Terrorism and religion are highly entwined in Muslim extremism today; the juncture cannot be ignored by our security services."' 47 Furthermore, because it is
Muslims who pose the terrorist threat to the United States, it is prudent for those security services to track the Muslim-American community for suspicious behavior: "[W]hen one reflects that there are
several million Muslims in the United States and that a tiny number of
terrorists may be able to cause catastrophic harm to a nation, the government should not have to stand by helplessly" while extremism
144 The "King" is, in effect, the executive branch as a whole. More specifically, if the policy
arm of the executive (e.g., the president, Cabinet, senior executive agency officials) is relatively
free to design its security policies at will, those implementing the policies (e.g., homeland security and immigration agents at borders, transportation authority officials in airports, spies in
mosques) similarly may carry out their security functions without fear of legal resistance or
accountability. See The Wire: Misgivings (HBO television broadcast Nov. 19, 2006) ("The
patrolling officer on his beat is the one true dictatorship in America."). President Harry Truman's impermissible seizure of steel plants during the Korean War reflects the dangers of an
unfettered wartime executive to private rights. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down the President's executive order to seize privately owned steel
mills, in the course of the American conflict in Korea, holding that the President did not act
pursuant to an act of Congress or constitutional grant of authority). Youngstown illustrates the
judicial limitation placed on the President's powers during the Korean War. Youngstown, thus,
serves as a contrast to Posner's arguments that the judicial branch is ill-equipped to judge, or
should refrain from interfering with, the executive's decisions concerning national safety.
145 See discussion infra Part IX on the inadequacy of a political check on the executive by
the right to vote.
146 The Wire: Not for Attribution (HBO television broadcast Jan. 20, 2008).
147 POSNER, NYF A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 6, at 116.
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spreads.14 8 Posner therefore argues that the government may, without
running afoul of constitutional mandates, surreptitiously intercept and
sift through a Muslim-American's electronic communications and personal information, subject Muslim-Americans to additional security
procedures in the airport setting, and shadow Muslim priests in American mosques to listen for provocative religious lectures.
With respect to electronic communications, Posner claims that
"surreptitious eavesdropping need impose no costs at all on people
who don't know they're being eavesdropped on, or who know but
don't care because they have nothing they particularly care to hide
from the eavesdropper."1 49 He also contends that any constitutional
complications with surreptitious eavesdropping of electronic communications can be eased with a two-pronged system in which a computer program first filters the communications, and a human then
reviews only those aspects of the communications identified by the
computer.5 o
Concerning the effect on those subjected to the surveillance, Posner argues, "An electronic search no more invades privacy than does a
dog trained to sniff out illegal drugs, though the dog's 'alerting' to the
presence of drugs in a container provides probable cause for a
(human) investigator to search the container.""5 ' Posner suggests that
even if an individual's privacy is invaded, the individual is not truly
"harmed . . . in any practical sense."' 5 2 It "might," according to Posner, "cause ... at least transitory emotional distress, and that is a harm
even if it has no rational basis."153
Finally, Posner argues that the government's intelligence entities
may "want to maintain a close watch on radical imams in the U.S.
Muslim community of several million people . . . even if there is no

basis for thinking that any of these imams has yet crossed the line that
separates advocacy [which may not be constitutionally suppressed]
from incitement" of violence, which may be constitutionally suppressed.' 54 Posner acknowledges that roaming the mosques for such
incitement may chill the speech of Muslim worshippers, who may be
148 Id. at 124.
149 Id. at 90.

150 See id. at 99-100.
151 Id. at 130.
152 Id. at 131.
153 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACr, supra note 6, at 131.

154 Id. at 111-12 (emphases added).
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less inclined to express themselves or to join the congregation in the
first place.' Posner contends, however, that the cost to speech may
be worth it depending "on the importance of the investigative activities to national security. "156
It is doubtless that those who count least today, the "pawns" in
the American post-9/11 security chessboard, are the innocent Americans who are Muslim or are perceived to be Muslim."' The Wire
powerfully speaks to the absence of consideration for the "pawns" in
Baltimore, including those without the political clout or the social status to be taken seriously by others. In the series' final season, a Baltimore Sun reporter was disappointed to learn that her article on a
triple murder, which had been slotted as a front-page story, was
instead buried deep inside the paper and edited down considerably.'5 8
A fellow reporter explained the article's placement by stating that the
victims were "dead where it doesn't count."" 9 In other words, they
were pawns in the blighted parts of Baltimore whose lives had been
marginalized in the existing social structure. In condoning the minimized constitutional protections to be afforded to Muslim-Americans,
Posner targets a people who have been placed on the fringe of our
collective conscience when it comes to a full recognition of individual
rights in the post-9/11 world. Posner's proposition that infringements
upon the constitutional rights of Muslim-Americans do not count,
however, cannot be squared with the basic legal system within which
we live.
Even if Muslim-Americans are not cognizant of the fact that they
are being eavesdropped on, they may still have a sense that they are
being profiled on the basis of their religion. In a recent article, I
released the results of a study that shows that 70.7% of Muslim-American respondents believe, 45.0% strongly, that their online activities
155 Id. at 112.
156 Id. at 112-13.

157 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1575, 1576 (2002)
("Th[e] article suggests that September 11 facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category
that groups together persons who appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim,' whereby members
of this group are identified as terrorists and disidentified as citizens."); see also Muneer I.
Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September II Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92
CAL. L. REv. 1259 (2004) (discussing the extent of the public and private racial violence against
Muslims, Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs after 9/11).
158 The Wire: Not for Attribution (HBO television broadcast Jan. 20, 2008).
159 Id.
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are being monitored by the government. 160 The same study reveals
that 8.4% of Muslims have altered their online behavior as a result of
the belief that their electronic activities are being monitored by the
government. 16 ' Even if Muslim-Americans are not monitored, they
are nevertheless chilled in their speech. Extrapolating these numbers
to the "several million" Muslims in the United States figure that Posner references, yields a large number of Muslims who believe that
they are under surveillance and who have chosen to limit their online
activities as a consequence.162 Furthermore, people with "nothing to
hide" do not become indifferent towards the government's eavesdropping on them. This is why the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution1 63 generally requires the government to possess an appropriate
basis to search an individual and does not first require that the individual establish that he has nothing to hide.164
160 Dawinder S. Sidhu, The Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the
Use of the Internet by Muslim-Americans, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASs 375,
390-91 (2007).
161 Id. at 391.
162 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, MUSLIMS IN AMERICA - A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT (2008), available at http://www.america.gov/st/peopleplace-english/2008/December/20081222090246
jmnamdeirf0.4547083.html ("The size of the Muslim-American population has proved difficult to
measure because the U.S. Census does not track religious affiliation. Estimates vary widely from
2 million to 7 million. What is clear, however, is that the Muslim-American population has been
growing rapidly as a result of immigration, a high birth rate, and conversions.").
163 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsIT. amend. IV.
164 See, e.g., Leslie A. Maria, Investigation and Police Practices: Overview of the Fourth
Amendment, 86 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1187 (1998) ("The Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution governs all searches and seizures conducted by government agents. The Amendment contains two separate clauses: A prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and a requirement that probable cause support each warrant issued."); Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the
"Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime
Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 811 (2003) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . generally requires a
search warrant or special factual circumstances for the government to go into private spaces that
are protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy."). See generally Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) (expressing the view
that a "right to be let alone" exists). To the extent that the concept of consent in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence captures an individual's affirmative willingness to allow the government to
search him, consent is inapplicable to Posner's argument, which is premised on surreptitious
eavesdropping-one cannot consent to what one does not know. See, e.g., Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) ("[O]f course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its
use pursuant to the suspect's consent.").
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Posner's creative suggestion regarding a bifurcated computer/
human review of communications does not resolve the possibility that
harmless speech may be flagged by the electronic part of the surveillance mechanism and thereafter transmitted to a human reviewer.
Although the computer, as a filter of communication, is an inanimate
entity and preserves some semblance of privacy, it is still fallible. In
particular, it is susceptible to overinclusiveness of allegedly suspicious
communications. Thus, a human may ultimately read electronic information of a legitimate or personal nature. In this respect, Posner's
two-pronged system may, at best, reduce the number of false positives, but it does not eliminate the constitutional difficulties with
respect to surreptitious eavesdropping.
Posner's comparison of electronic surveillance to a dog sniffing
for drugs, although perhaps reasonable on the surface, does not upon
deeper inspection alleviate any genuine constitutional concerns. The
surreptitious eavesdropping contemplated by post-9/11 security measures is not random; it is targeted at members of one community or
those perceived to be members of that community. To use a more apt
metaphor, a police car that stops some people, but not all, for speeding is fine so long as the officer is genuinely attempting to survey all
cars or, say, every tenth car for speeding. The situation becomes problematic when the officer stops some people because the officer is looking only at cars driven by certain people, based on characteristics such
as ethnicity or skin color.165 The selective application by government
security or investigative efforts on one class of individuals-even if
initially conducted by a non-human-is unjust because it is based on
actual or perceived race, religion, or national origin.'6 6
Contrary to Posner's assertion that any harm suffered by stricter
airport security measures is at most "transitory emotional distress,"
such harm extends beyond the targeted individual to all members of
that community who may realize that they are now subject to different
rules and to the prospect of being treated less than equally on account
of their actual or perceived race, religion, or national origin. Not only
is this harm more extensive in scope, it is also more expansive in
depth; a Muslim profiled in an airport walks away with more than hurt
165 See STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE: THE IMMORALITY OF PUNISHING BY
DEATil 64 (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2d ed. 2001) (1992) (postulating that such enforcement punishes people based on appearance and constitutes an abuse of power).
166 See id.
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emotions. The qualitative and quantitative aspects of his experiences
with a public accommodation supposedly open on equal terms to all
Americans are significantly affected, a situation reminiscent of the
African-American plight with public accommodations in the 1960s.167
As a result, Muslims may use other modes of transportation to avoid
harassment or may not travel at all.
With regard to Posner's acceptance of surveilling Muslim clerics,
the importance of such investigative activities can be determined only
after the fact, after the government has scoured mosques and chilled
the speech of adherents to Islam. In other words, it is acceptable in
Posner's formulation to chill the speech of Muslims at mosques, even
without any evidence that the speech contains incitement or a resemblance of incitement on the spectrum of religious rhetoric. Such curtailment would be justified if it is later found that objectionable
speech was uttered. Although such justification would extend to those
mosques at which radical teachings took place, it would not apply to
those mosques innocent of such teachings, making those mosques victims of an unnecessary, presumptive invasion. The approach offered
by Posner presumes that a Muslim mosque is a potential breeding
ground for incitement of violence against the United States.168
Posner acknowledges that generally "more speech" is preferable
to the chilling of speech but writes, "[I]t is unclear what counterarguments are available to opponents" of instructional, appealing rhetoric
from imams.169 What is the antidote to such speech, Posner asks.o7 0
Posner underestimates the attractiveness of the fundamental principles of liberty and religious freedom that form the intellectual foundation of the American republic. The concept, that man is free to live in
America and develop a relationship with God in accordance with the
dictates of his conscience and without government interference or
coercion, is one that should be offered in response to those who
"hate" the United States."'7 American values and ideals can resonate
167 See Sidhu, supra note 160, at 379 (drawing parallels between the civil rights findings in
the landmark case of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and the
post-9/11 climate facing Muslims and others).
168 A more constitutionally accepted alternative would be one requiring investigative powers to possess some degree of evidence that particular imams should be monitored.
169 POSNER, NOT A SuICIoE PACr, supra note 6, at 122.
170 See id.

171See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) ("The place of religion in
our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the ... inviolable
citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience
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with the hearts and minds of all men and can commensurately diminish the misguided intention to cripple the greatest experiment in liberty and religious freedom ever known. 17 2
The arguments put forth by Posner with respect to profiling Muslims in the United States do not pass constitutional muster. They are
not only legally infirm, but may also be counterproductive as a practical matter. First, and perhaps most evident, these arguments if implemented would alienate the very community from which cooperation is
necessary for the threat of terrorism to be properly averted.17 3 Posner
recognizes this possibility but nonetheless contends that the benefits
of his suggestions outweigh the costs and, thus, must be brought
within the Constitution.174 Second, such profiling would induce terrorists to recruit and employ individuals who defy the operative "Muslim male" profile.1'7
There are doctrinal as well as pragmatic reasons to dispute Posner's proposals, which are predicated on the notion that MuslimAmericans are a rightfully marginalized community whose constitutional rights are less meaningful in the post-9/11 context."1 6 In ensuring that the rights of Muslim-Americans "count" in the modern
constitutional design, we will not only safeguard our legal principles
but will also aid our anti-terrorism efforts moving forward.
that it is not within the power of the government to invade that citadel . . . ."); Schneider v.

Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968) ("The First Amendment[ ] ... create[s] a preserve where the views
of the individual are made inviolate."); see also JON MEACIHAM, AMERICAN GosPEL: Goo, Tni
FOUNDING FATHERS, AND TlHE MAKING OF A NATION 6 (Random House 2006) (positing generally that the American "public religion" is one in which the Founders believed there was a Creator God, but that the individual was free to decide whether there was a God, gods, or no God at
all).
172 It is this appeal to conscience that, regrettably, is not part of the battle against fundamentalists. See POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACr, supra note 6, at 5 ("[W]e have no strategy for
defeating them, only for fighting them.").
173 See Kevin R. Johnson, ProtectingNational Security Through More Liberal Admission of
Immigrants, 2007 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 157, 187-88 (2007) ("The many measures the U.S. government directed at Arabs and Muslims after September 11 estranged these communities, thereby
damaging the nation's efforts to collect necessary intelligence.").
174 See POSNi, NOT A SuICID PAcr, supra note 6, at 50, 117-19. The temptation for and
danger of the authorities viewing the people they are to serve as the enemy has been explored
in The Wire. See The Wire: Reformation (HBO television broadcast Nov. 28, 2004) ("[W]hen
you're at war, you need a fucking enemy.

And pretty soon, damn near everybody on every

corner is your fucking enemy. And soon the neighborhood that you're supposed to be policing,
that's just occupied territory.").
175 See POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACr, supra note 6, at 117-18.

176 See id. at 50.
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DISCRIMINATION

"Deserve got nuthin' to do with it.""'
- Felicia "Snoop" Pearson, The Wire
Posner suggests that due to the terrorist threat, the government
can permissibly surveil the communications and information of Muslims in the United States, profile Muslims in airports, and stake out
mosques for inflammatory teachings.17 8 These suggestions are based
solely on shared religious identity, not on any evidence of terrorism.'7 9
Posner writes that inevitably "some of the personal information gathered by intelligence agencies pertains to people who have no links to
terrorism"80 and that "radical imams" should be monitored "even if
there is no basis for thinking" that they have incited violence against
the United States.' 8 ' To justify his position, Posner states that profiling of Muslims is "mild" in comparison to other civil rights violations,
such as the internment of the Japanese and the segregation of AfricanAmerican students.'82 To diminish the actual or perceived burden on
Muslims, Posner volunteers that non-Muslims should be subject to
heightened surveillance as well so Muslims do not feel singled out. 83
Posner's suggestions call into question what may constitute an
acceptable basis for negative treatment and specifically whether religion may be the sole factor in a judgment that surveillance and profiling of Muslims is permissible legally or sensible practically. In the
penultimate episode of The Wire, Michael Lee, a teenage product of
the Baltimore streets, asks a superior in his drug crew's hierarchy,
Felicia "Snoop" Pearson, why he's been singled out by the drug ring's
leader to be executed even though he did not violate any internal code
of conduct warranting any punishment, much less death.'" Snoop
177

The Wire: Late Editions (HBO television broadcast Mar. 2, 2008).

178 See POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACr, supra note 6, at 117-20 (suggesting that profiling

of "Islamic terrorism" is less problematic compared to "ordinary crimes").
179 See id. at 111-12, 130.
180 Id. at 130.
181 Id. at 111-12.
182 Id. at 119.
183 See id. at 118.

184 See The Wire: Late Editions (HBO television broadcast Mar. 2, 2008). Michael's
alleged transgression was providing the police with information that led to the arrest of the
principals of a drug organization. Id. In truth, Michael was not a "snitch" or police informant.
Id.
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curtly responds, "[D]eserve got nuthin' to do with it."' 5 In other
words, actual guilt is an irrelevant consideration. It is enough that the
powers that be, the "king" in this case, suspected that Michael was
86
guilty.'
Especially in times of crisis, mere suspicion has served as the
basis for adverse actions and decisions irrespective of evidence. Such
suspicion generally is premised on a single characteristic-race,
ethnicity, or national origin-that individuals share with America's
enemies. When the judiciary fails to meaningfully check the other two
branches, race, religion, or national origin may be legitimized as a
proxy for suspicion, and the adverse actions or decisions consequently
attain the imprimatur of the Constitution.
This was perhaps most evident during World War II. In response
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, over 100,000 individuals of Japanese
descent on the West Coast of the United States were taken from their
homes and were placed into internment camps pursuant to an executive order signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt." In the infamous 1944 case Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the executive order that had given rise
to the internment, deferring significantly to the government's arguments regarding the military necessity of the relocation. 18 The Court
noted that the petitioner, who was born in California to Japanese parents, was subject to the order and interned not because of any racial
animus towards the Japanese, but rather:
[B]ecause we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because
they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that
185 Id.

186 See id. Bodie, another character on The Wire, encountered a similar issue, as he was
suspected of wrongdoing (in his case sharing confidential information with the police, even
though he did no such thing) and was executed as a result. The Wire: Final Grades (HBO
television broadcast Dec. 10, 2006).
187 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1944); see also Exec. Order No.
9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
188 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 ("Nothing short of apprehension by the proper military
authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify [the
exclusion] . ... The military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our
shores, concluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion. They did
so ... in accordance with Congressional authority to the military to say who should, and who
should not, remain in the threatened areas.").
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all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily .

..

19

In another case upholding the conviction of an American citizen of
Japanese ancestry for violating the exclusion order and curfew
requirements imposed after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Court
observed, "We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by
experience, that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with
an invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a
different ancestry."' 90
Justice Jackson dissented from the Court's ruling in Korematsu,
forewarning that the majority had validated a principle of racial discrimination that:
[L]ies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every
repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking
and expands it to new purposes. All who observe the work of courts
are familiar with what Judge [Benjamin] Cardozo described as "the
tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic."...
[I]f [the courts] review and approve, that passing incident becomes the
doctrine of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its
own, and all that it creates will be in its own image. 191
Posner's suggestions that Muslims can be singled out for surveillance
and additional security measures, which absent any evidence of
189 Id. at 223.

190 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943). Recently, the Supreme Court
issued a decision in a case brought by a Muslim detained after 9/11 who alleged discrimination
by high-level government officials. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). In the course
of its discussion on whether the detainee's complaint satisfied the pleading standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the majority noted:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted
themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al
Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim-Osama bin Laden-and composed in large
part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link
to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even
though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.
Id. at 1951. Given that the ruling centered around the sufficiency of the complaint (i.e., did the
complaint comply with Federal Rule 8(a)(2)) and did not pass on the merits of the claims of
discrimination (i.e., were the detainee's constitutional rights violated), it is unclear what the
import of this excerpt is, if any. This question will require resolution elsewhere.
191 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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wrongdoing or suspected wrongdoing amount to blanket racial discrimination, are difficult to reconcile with Justice Jackson's guidance
from another wartime moment in America's history.
Posner's proposition that the profiling of Muslims is somehow
less severe than the discriminatory measures faced by Japanese- and
African-Americans is unconvincing. 92 That the form of the discrimination may seem less invidious does not deflect the fact that profiling
is discriminatory in substance. Profiling in the post-9/11 may not seem
as unfavorable as other practices, but this comparison does not change
the nature of profiling from discriminatory to non-discriminatory.
Regarding the idea that security measures applied to Muslims
should be applied to non-Muslims to furnish the appearance of equal
treatment,1 93 the result would be just that-nothing more than an
appearance. Tricking Muslims into believing they are subject to nondiscriminatory security policies does not change the intent of the policies in the first instance, namely to target Muslims. Posner's proposal
may not only fail to alter the discriminatory content of the security
efforts, it may also make things worse. The pernicious effects would
be to conceal discrimination from its victims, to effectively prohibit
any resultant complaints, and, therefore, to immunize the government
from having to answer for its discriminatory tactics.
The terrorist attack upon the United States necessitated a
response both internal and external to America's borders. The clear
threat to national security required the government to determine how
best to prevent a subsequent attack from occurring. As modern as the
attack was, the security elements of the government do not operate on
a blank slate. It has its own history from which to glean the proper
limits of America's security measures. A lesson from the World War
II era applies today despite social, economic, and technological
advancement in the interim: Suspicion of guilt premised on race,
religion, or national origin alone is impermissible and runs against the
very Constitution and pluralistic republic we seek to defend. Posner
suggests that Muslim rights may be sacrificed on the margins even in
the absence of any evidentiary support for suspecting Muslims of
wrongdoing.194 This is a fate they do not deserve and that our system
of laws should not permit.
192 See POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcr, supra note 6, at 119.
193 Id. at 118.
194 Id. at 130.
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TORTURE

"You play in dirt, you get dirty."195
- James "Jimmy" McNulty, The Wire

Posner's post-9/11 constitutional construct, in which liberty may
be sacrificed if marginal gains to national security may result, allows
for the mistreatment of people as well as the use of a highly controversial practice: torture. Posner supports the notion that torture may be
used in "extreme situations" or in an "extreme emergency" where
information can be elicited.' 96 He contends that the "propriety" of
using a "high degree of coercion" cannot be reasonably denied and
that the reply of those who do entertain such a denial is that torture
never works. 197 Posner further states that while some may have moral
objections to torture, they "should not be allowed to occlude consideration of instrumental considerations."' 98
The propriety of using aggressive tactics with suspects is another
theme present in The Wire. For example, Baltimore city officer Eddie
Walker employed questionable deterrent methods in dealing with
younger troublemakers in the community: Breaking the fingers of a
youth who routinely stole cars and pocketing the money of another
who was fleeing police.'9 9 A number of the youth sought revenge and
were successful in pouring yellow paint on Officer Walker, publicly
embarrassing him.200 His colleague, James "Jimmy" McNulty, later
commented on the situation, "You play in dirt, you get dirty."2 01 The
motive to retaliate was understandable given the manner in which
Officer Walker engaged those subject to his authority. The Wire thus
touches on the practical realities of the abuse of power and the natural
inclination to contemptuously respond to it.2 02
195 The Wire: A New Day (HBO television broadcast Nov. 26, 2006).
196 POSNER, NOT A SuIcDe PAcr, supra note 6, at 83.
197 Id. at 81.

198 Id. at 83; see aLso id. at 85 (suggesting that whether torture "shocks the conscience" is a
subjective, relative judgment).
199 The Wire: Misgivings (HBO television broadcast Nov. 19, 2006).
200 The Wire: A New Day (HBO television broadcast Nov. 26, 2006).
201 Id

202 Ironically, Officer McNulty later conceived a plan to make it seem as if there was a
serial killer on the loose in Baltimore so as to ensure that greater resources would be dedicated
to the police department, resources that could be used in the apprehension of a drug "king."
The Wire: Not for Attribution (HBO television broadcast Jan. 20, 2008). Officer McNulty's
efforts, although well-intended, were clearly illegal. He not only lost his job, but the "king" was
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With respect to torture, it is quite clearly impermissible on legal,
principled, and practical grounds. Professor Jordan J. Paust notes:
[C]ustomary and treaty-based human rights law requires, without
exception, that no persons shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment. The same absolute prohibition
exists in customary and treaty-based laws of war. For example, common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions requires that all persons
detained "shall in all circumstances be treated humanely," and that
"[t]o this end ... at any time and in any place ... cruel treatment and
torture" are proscribed in addition to "outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." Article 5 of the
Geneva Civilian Convention reiterates that "[i]n each case" persons
detained as security threats shall "be treated with humanity," a
requirement that is also reflected in Article 27. Additionally, Article
31 requires that "[njo physical or moral coercion shall be exercised
against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from
them," and Article 33 prohibits "all measures of intimidation." 203
The United States is a signatory of the Geneva Conventions. 2 " As
such, these prohibitions are not simple pronouncements of international human rights norms that lie in ether beyond the borders of the
United States. Rather, they are commitments the nation has obligated itself to comply with and brought well within the realm of the
American legal landscape.20 5
not prosecuted due to the inadmissibility of the evidence produced by the plan. The Wire: -30(HBO television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).
203 Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained
Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'iL L.J. 503, 530-31 (2003) (alteration in original) (internal footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).
204 See INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, INTERNATIONAL COMMIFFEE OF THE RED

CRoss (ICRC), STATES PARTY TO TIE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (2005), available at http://www.

icrc.org/ihl.nsflWebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P.
205 See United States v. Khadr, CMCR 07-001, at 4 n.4 (Ct. Mil. Comm'n Rev. Sept. 24,
2007), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/CMCR%20ruling%209-2407.pdf. ("The United States is a signatory nation to all four Geneva Conventions. The Geneva
Conventions are generally viewed as self-executing treaties (i.e., ones which become effective
without the necessity of implementing congressional action), form a part of American law, and
are binding in federal courts under the Supremacy Clause." (citing U.S. CONsr. art. VI, § 2)
("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
)).
the supreme law of the land ....
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Furthermore, the problem is not that torture never works.
Instead, it is that information extracted from the use of torture can be
obtained by other means that do not rise to the level of torture and
therefore allow the American intelligence services to stay within the
bounds of applicable American legal obligations and comply with the
prevailing views of the international human rights community. As
President Obama noted after reviewing materials on waterboarding,
"[W]e could have gotten this information in other ways,"206 ways that
perhaps would not run afoul of those obligations. President Obama
added, "[W]e can still get information" using other techniques, even
though "[i]n some cases, it may be harder" to do so.207
Posner likely does not accept President Obama's view that the
use of torture "corrodes the character of [our] country" and stands in
opposition to "our ideals."208 If only arguments related to the success
or failure of torture-again, a simple cost-benefit analysis-are admissible, then it would be necessary to bring to the balance the distinct
possibility that the use of torture by the United States serves as a
recruitment tool for terrorist elements.2 09 If the nation employs techniques that are known to be considered by the enemy as contemptible
or "dirty," we essentially shroud ourselves in the very dirt that exists
as a marker for hatred and violence. This is true irrespective of our
own subjective value judgments of the usefulness of that investigative
practice. That taint will be difficult to undo, the hate commensurately
difficult to neutralize.2 10
The adoption of an official policy permitting the executive to
authorize torture in some situations-even in "extreme" ones-may
prove counterproductive and ultimately more harmful to American
security than information elicited from torture. Given that the infor206 President Barack Obama, 100th-Day Press Briefing (Apr. 29, 2009) (transcript available
on Westlaw at 2009 WL 1145265).
207 Id.
208 Id.

209 See e.g., Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L.
REv. 1405, 1446 (2008) (discussing El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), and
arguing that when the Executive Branch authorizes unconstitutional actions, such as torture, it
actually undermines national security because it recruits terrorists and proliferates hate against
the United States).
210 See, e.g., The Wire: All Prologue (HBO television broadcast July 6, 2003) ("[T]he past
is always with us. Where we come from, what we go through, how we go through it, all this shit
matters . . . . [Y]ou can change up . . . , you can say you're somebody new, and you can give

yourself a whole new story. But, what came first is who you really are and what happened
before is what really happened, and it don't matter that some fool say he different . . . .").
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mation may be obtainable by less drastic means, means that may not
lead to terrorist recruitment or the retaliation that The Wire portends,
it seems imprudent based on a purely pragmatic analysis to bring torture under the standard of the Constitution.
IX.

EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONALISM

"The tree that doesn't bend breaks." 211
- Marla Daniels, The Wire

Francis Biddle, President Roosevelt's Attorney General during

World War II, once opined, "[T]he Constitution has never greatly
bothered any wartime President." 2 12 Biddle expressed the practical
reality that presidents will do whatever it takes to defend the United
States even if those actions technically transgress the established limits
of the Constitution.2 13 For his part, Posner endorses the view that, in
times of war, the executive is empowered to act outside the law if
doing so would help ensure the preservation of the nation.2 14 Indeed,
the title of the book, Not a Suicide Pact, is derived in part from the
Supreme Court's

statement in Kennedy

v.

Mendoza-Martinez:

"[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual
rights, it is not a suicide pact." 215 In the opening paragraph of the
book, Posner writes that civil liberties are flexible and must give way
to public safety interests because "a Constitution that will not bend
will break."216 Elsewhere, Posner echoes Biddle's observation and
writes that those responsible for the nation's security will not, on their
own, give much weight to individual rights in reaching security decisions; 217 the executive will use torture to gain information even if there
is no cognizable right to do so. 2 18
In reference to President Abraham Lincoln's decision to suspend
habeas corpus rights during the Civil War, Posner notes that "to violate one constitutional provision (the suspension provision) in order to
save the Constitution as a whole" is "not a legal argument" because
211 The Wire: -30- (HBO television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).
212 FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AuTlorry

219 (1962).

213 See id.
214 See POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcT, supra note 6, at 158, 170.

215 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,160 (1963).
216 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACr, supra note 6, at 1.
217 See id.at 61.
218 See id.at 38.
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there is "no such grant of authority" to violate the Constitution. 2 19
Instead, it is a pragmatic response to the dire conditions precipitating
the extra-constitutional action.22 0 There is a "law of necessity" that
"supersedes the law of the Constitution." 22 1 Put differently, the "law
of necessity" is not a "law" but the "trumping of law by necessity." 2 22
As Lincoln himself asked rhetorically, "[A]re all the laws, but one, to
go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one

be violated?" 2 23
With regard to such extra-constitutional acts, Posner thinks it
unwise to codify situations or moments when the government may
sidestep the Constitution because those rules may be ill-defined and
may be tested to their outer limits. 22 4 Instead, Posner finds it preferable to let stand an implicit, default rule that the executive can suspend
the laws when necessary.2 25 He reasons that prescribed rules generally
are meant to be broken and that a president will pay a higher political
price if he abuses the default rule.226
Posner dedicates the "main task" of his book "to suggest[ing] the
direction that the law should take, by assessing the relevant consequences and hoping that the Supreme Court will be convinced by the
assessment and shape the law accordingly." 2 27 In Not a Suicide Pact,
however, Posner argues that the executive can engage in extra-constitutional acts because it has a "moral duty to violate positive law. "228
To that end, Posner claims that presidents who disobey the law are
engaging in "civil disobedience" much in the same way that "Gandhi
and Martin Luther King, Jr." did in their situations.2 29
In the final episode of the series, Marla Daniels, an aspiring local
politician and ex-wife of Cedric Daniels, a deputy commissioner in
city police department, asks Cedric to consider resigning due to a
219 Id. at 40.
220 See id.

221 Id. at 70 (quoting Martin Sheffer).
222 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PAcu, supra note 6, at 158.
223 See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVAIS:

THE

PoorICAL GENIUS OF ABRA-

HAM LINCOlN 355 (2005).
224 See POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACE, supra note 6, at 86-87, 154.
225 See id. at 154.
226 See id.
227 Id. at 29.
228 Id. at 85.
229 Id.
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potential scandal in order to save her career.2 30 She reminds Cedric of
the need to be flexible in the face of unfavorable and emerging circumstances: "The tree that doesn't bend breaks," she advises.2 31
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist once noted, "The laws will ...
not be silent in time of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice." 23 2 The courts called upon to resolve constitutional questions during these difficult times will likely cede the point that the
executive possesses great power and greater power when it acts with
congressional approval. 2 33 Accordingly, Posner's opening salvo-that
"a Constitution that will not bend will break" 2 3 4-is relatively innocuous, but his additional step of declaring that the law may be permissively disregarded in favor of the "law of necessity" 235 must be
disputed.
Although Posner suggests that there exists a law of necessity that
may be invoked even if it violates the Constitution,23 6 the fact remains
that, since its founding, the United States has been a nation of laws.
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the nascent Supreme Court in
Marbury v. Madison, proclaimed, "The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men." 237 Marshall, in that same case, declared famously, "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. "238
The Supreme Court has spoken to the question of whether the
Constitution is a straightjacket on government action in the security
realm. In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, the Court, quoting Mendoza230 The Wire: -30- (HBO television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).
231 Id.
232 WuIuAM H.

RFiINQuIST, ALL Till' LAWS 1UT ONE:

Civii,

LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 225

(1998).
233 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his
authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate . . .. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain . . . . When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.").
234 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 6, at 1.

235 See id. at 158.
236 Id.

237 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
238 Id. at 177.
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Martinez, said that "'while the Constitution protects against invasions
of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.'" 239 But the Court added
in the very next sentence that "[a]t the same time the Constitution
requires that the powers of government 'must be so exercised as not,
in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe' a constitutionally
protected freedom." 24 0 In other words, legitimate governmental ends,
such as securing the nation, cannot be pursued by means that infringe
an individual right.241
Moreover, even if a "law of necessity" were to be considered an
inherent source of authority that existed outside American positive
law, in practice this "law" should not be advanced because of the
expediency within which it can be invoked and the dangers that may
result from its improvident use. Indeed, in reflecting on the Korematsu decision, Justice Jackson stated that the executive order "was
an unconstitutional one which the Court should not bring within the
Constitution by any doctrine of necessity, a doctrine too useful as a

precedent." 24 2
Posner's preference for an implicit rule that the President may
suspend laws when necessary is also untenable. Although it may be
the case that rules are meant to be broken, this proposition cannot be
held with respect to the Constitution. The Constitution was not
intended to be read as having holes in it or to be disregarded on a
whim. 243 To the contrary, it is the binding and highest law of the
land. 24
239 Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964) (quoting Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)).
240 Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)). Although MendozaMartinez gave rise to the "suicide pact" language, it was similar to Aptheker in that it concerned
an act of Congress.
241 The Court in Aptheker addressed the relationship between congressional power and the
right to travel. 378 U.S. at 507. One can imagine that the Court's pronouncement would be
more compelling with other individual rights that may be at stake in the context of 9/11, including the right of equal protection under the law.
242 Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Wartime Security
and Liberty Under Law, Address at the Buffalo Law School (May 9, 1951) in 1 Buve. L. REV.
103, 116 (1951).
243 See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1299, 1300 (2004) ("I doubt that the Constitution grants the President a latent and more powerful authority to sacrifice constitutional provisions in order to preserve and defend the Constitution and nation as a whole. In my view, though the Constitution creates a powerful chief
executive, it does not empower the President to suspend the Constitution in order to save it.").
244 See e.g., TilE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Until the people have, by
some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established form, [the federal Con-
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It is the belief in the rule of law that distinguishes the American
republic from other forms of government and that serves as a vital
tool in the post-9/11 campaign against extremist elements. As Deputy
Solicitor General Neal Katyal observed, "[If we're going to win the
war on terror, we are going to win it through our soft power, we're
going to win it through saying to the world that we actually have a
better model than you because in your countries you settle these
things through force and fiat, and here we settle them through law, we
settle them through law."245 An executive bypassing the law would
deny the country this instrument of international diplomacy and of
attraction to American principles and interests.
With regard to Posner's contention that the executive will be subject to political costs for extra-constitutional acts, even if an executive
suffers voter retribution for abusing his power, there are additional
costs that go beyond a political death. These externalities include the
precedent set for successive executives to take risky steps outside of
the bounds of the Constitution and the loss of public confidence in the
executive office (not just in the administration of a single executive).
More fundamentally, winning a subsequent election or staying in relatively good public graces does not serve as ad hoc approval of any
extra-constitutional conduct. As the Supreme Court noted in
Aptheker, a legitimate end does not sanction impermissible means,24 6
and the public cannot, through political speech, bring executive action
within the law. Independent courts insulated from popular will, not
popular will by itself, are charged with the duty to define what is legal.
The law is not an entity subservient to the executive; to the contrary,
the executive is sworn to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States," not the nation. 24 7 In other words, the president is duty-bound to preserve the Constitution, irrespective of any
political consequences.
stitution] is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or
even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it,
prior to such an act."). To the extent that the question is one of a default rule or established
rules, the people should favor a situation in which there are expressly enumerated constitutional
provisions that the executive can ignore in times of war, as opposed to one in which all provisions are up for grabs and can be potentially transgressed. To limit the universe of areas in which
the executive can frolic would be to circumscribe the possible abuses of extra-constitutional
executive action.
245 Neal Katyal, Comments at the American Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006).
246 Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 509 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940)).
247 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
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Turning to Posner's moral imperative argument, there are critical
differences between presidents, such as Lincoln, and individuals like
Gandhi and Dr. King. 2 4 8 The former have authority not only to execute laws but also to change them through the political process and
through their exercise of constitutional power. The latter are those
challenging discriminatory laws and the oppressive effects of the use
of power by institutions and officials with power and authority. The
former have many legal tools at their disposal, while the latter are
forced to rely on civil disobedience precisely because they lack political clout. The former are elected by way of the majoritarian democratic process, while the latter represent marginalized members of
society without the rights enjoyed by others. Ultimately, the former
are kings, and the latter are pawns.249
In sum, the Constitution may bend in times of crisis, although
there are limits on the degree to which it is flexible. Perhaps most
important are the inherent limits set forth by the law itself. Practical
considerations also cut against Posner's proposition that the extraconstitutionality is permissible in the wartime era. Specifically, as Justice Jackson pointed out, stepping outside the Constitution establishes
a dangerous precedent subject to executive abuse.25 0 In addition, an
element of "soft power" in the current war is denied if we fail to
remain faithful to the Constitution. Finally, the moral underpinnings
for civil disobedience do not support an alleged executive duty to act
outside of the law, but rather entitle the relatively powerless to object
to oppressive laws through non-compliance.
CONCLUSION

Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, "The words of the Constitution .

.

. are so unrestricted by their intrinsic meaning or by their his-

tory or by tradition or by prior decisions that they leave the individual
Justice free, if indeed they do not compel him, to gather meaning not
from reading the Constitution but from reading life." 25 1 This Article
has attempted to invoke one aspect of my life-knowledge of The
248 See POSNER, NOT A SuIcIDE PACt, supra note 6, at 85.

249 Posner's moral argument seems odd, not only because of the stated legal purpose of the
book, but also because in other works Posner has likened morality to purely subjective, valuejudgments that lack intrinsic value in ascertaining objective truths. See Sidhu, supra note 94, at
81-82.
250 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
251 Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court, 3 Parliamentary Affairs 55, 68 (1949).
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Wire-to challenge Judge Richard A. Posner's book, Not a Suicide
Pact.

Posner characterizes his book as an attempt "to suggest the direction that the law should take." 25 2 Posner's book, therefore, is one
about the law-particularly, about how the courts should decide questions of constitutional law that implicate national security and individual rights in the post-9/11 world. To more fully appreciate Posner's
arguments, this article has offered additional thoughts from a legal
and practical perspective on some of the major contentions in Posner's
wartime constitutional framework.
The most disquieting aspect of Posner's overall analysis is the
extent to which he views executive authority in times of war. Posner
allows for the executive to not only stretch the law but also ignore it
when any allegedly troublesome circumstances or subjective moral
views tempt the executive to do so."' In Posner's scheme, there are
no meaningful checks on the executive, even with the knowledge that
the executive is significantly inclined to serve national security without
regard for protected rights. In a nation of laws and not men, and in a
nation where the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, Posner's
framework allows the law to be reduced to a nullity if the practical
benefits outweigh the "costs" of exhibiting faithfulness to the law.
This is not an exercise in law so much as a recipe for executive abuse,
judicial abdication, and constitutional meaninglessness.
"The tree that doesn't bend breaks," 25 4 Marla Daniels noted to
Cedric. We must not forget his response: "Bend too far, and you're
already broken." 255 This is an outcome that Posner blesses yet one
this Article hopes this constitutional republic will avoid.

252 POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT, supra note 6, at 29.

253 See supra Part IX.
254 The Wire: -30- (HBO television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).
255 Id.

